Tea (Chain)

This is not a writeup, just my notes about the machine.

Machine information

Operating System: Microsoft Windows Server 2022 Standard

Chain: True (2 Machines)

Credentials

Username
Password
Method
Scope

✅ Valid Usernames

🔑 Passwords list

Information Gathering

Nmap

Service Enumeration

10.10.187.181

DNS

  • Not vulnerable to DNS Zone Transfer

SMB (enum4linux-ng)

  • Domain SID: S-1-5-21-4071478895-3826761629-2568933575

  • Domain: tea.vl

  • FQDN: DC.tea.vl

  • Server allows null session authentication

  • Parent Domain

  • signing: True (Not vulnerable to NTLM Relay)

10.10.187.182

HTTP:80 (Simple IIS Default Web Site)

HTTP:3000 Gitea

Compromising SRV Server

Signing up a gitea account

Discovering a Runner into the gitea instance

Useful doc: hacking-on-gitea-actionsarrow-up-right

Exploiting Gitea via Runners

Requirements:

  1. Create a new repository

  2. Enable Repository Actions

  3. Upload the next file: .gitea/workflows/filename.yaml

Reading LAPS credentials

During the enumeration the tester found a files that indicate the presence of LAPS into the system.

Compromising Domain Controller DC.TEA.VL

Inspecting the WSUS into the computer

Tool: SharpWSUSarrow-up-right (Recommended Version)

Abusing Windows Server Update Services (WSUS)

Dumping Administrator NT hash

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