Lustrous (Chain)

This is not a writeup, just my notes about the machine.

Machine information

Operating System: Microsoft Windows Server 2022 Standard

Chain: True (2 Machines)

Credentials

Username
Password
Method
Scope

ben.cox

Trinity1

Asreproasting

Domain User

svc_web

iydgTvmujl6f

Kerberoasting

Domain Users + SPN

tony.ward

U_cPVQqEI50i1X

Silver Ticket

Domain User

✅ Valid Usernames

🔑 Passwords list

Information Gathering

Nmap Scan

Service Enumeration

10.10.205.53

FTP

  • FTP Anonymous Enabled

  • Users found into the FTP server

DNS

  • Not vulnerable to DNS Zone Transfer

SMB (enum4linux-ng)

  • Root/Parent Domain

  • Domain SID: S-1-5-21-2355092754-1584501958-1513963426

  • Domain: lustrous.vl

  • FQDN: LusDC.lustrous.vl

  • SMB Signing: True (Not vulnerable to NTLM Relay)

  • Server allows null session authentication

HTTP:80

401 Unauthorized indicate the presence of Kerberos authentication

Kerberos

  • User enumeration revealed valid usernames using statistically-likely-usernames/john.smith.txt

Compromising LUSMS

Initial foothold on LUSMS

Discovering Users within FTP Service

Discovering users via kerberos user enumeraiton

Cracking the ben.cox password using hashcat

Valid Credentials: ben.cox:Trinity1

Discovering kerberoastable users using the valid credentials

Cracking ticket grating service for svc_web

Valid Credentials: svc_web:iydgTvmujl6f

Privilege Escalation to Administrator

Retrieving the administrator credentials

During the enumeration the tester found a System.Management.Automation.PSCredential object in admin.xml that containing the Administrator credentials encrypted.

The tester used Import-CliXML to obtain the administrator's plain text credentials.

Authenticating as Administrator in LUSMS

Compromising Domain Controller (lustrous.vl)

Authenticating into lusdc.lustrous.vl website with valid credentials

Using ben.cox credentials the tester was able to authenticate to the web site using kerberos authentication.

Discovering a high valuable target using Bloodhound

While analyzing BloodHound, the tester discovered a highly valuable target, tony.ward, who is a member of the Backup Operators group. This group allows users to dump the SAM, SYSTEM, and SECURITY registry hives, as well as the NTDS.dit file.

Knowing that, the tester proceeded to use svc_web account and create a silver ticket to access to the application on behalf of tony.ward.

Crafting silver ticket for tony.ward using mimikatz.exe

Requesting to the web application and discovering tony.ward credentials

Abusing Backup operator to compromise domain controller

Dumping Registry Hives using BackupOperatorToDA

Dumping the Local Security Authority

Performing DCSync Attack

Authenticating as Administrator

Privilege escalation from Administrator to NT Autority System

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